That is, if D is decisive, then the stable model semantics of P(D) corresponds to the provability in defeasible logic. However part (c) is not true in the general case, as the following example shows. Example 5. Consider the defeasible theory r 1 : ) :p r 2 : p ) p In defeasible logic, +@:p cannot be proven because we cannot derive ?@p. However, blocked(r 2 ) is included in the only stable model of P(D), so def-:p is a sceptical conclusion of P(D) under stable model semantics.
If we wish to have an equivalence result without the condition of decisiveness, then we must use a di erent logic programming semantics, namely Kunen semantics.
Theorem 3. 
Conclusion
We motivated and presented a translation of defeasible theories into logic programs, such that the defeasible conclusions of the former correspond exactly with the sceptical conclusions of the latter under the stable model semantics, if a condition of decisiveness is satis ed. If decisiveness is not satis ed, we have to use Kunen semantics instead. This paper closes an important gap in the theory of nonmonotonic reasoning, in that it relates defeasible logic with mainstream semantics of logic programming. This result is particularly important, since defeasible reasoning is one of the most successful nonmonotonic reasoning paradigms in applications. 
Properties of the Translation
We begin with an observation on the size of the translation. By the size of a defeasible theory, we mean the number of rules. Next we establish relationships between D and its translation P(D). To do so we must select appropriate logic program semantics to interpret not. First we consider stable model semantics. { d 1 (r) says that to prove p defeasibly by applying r, we must prove all the antecedents of r, the negation of p should not be strictly provable, and it must be ok to apply r. { The clause d 2 (r) says when it is ok to apply a rule r with head p: we must check that it is ok to apply r w.r.t. every rule with head p. Finally, there is a aw in the use of explicit (or classical) negation in the translated program to represent explicit negation in the defeasible theory. Logic programs, under the answer set semantics, react to an inconsistency by inferring all literals whereas defeasible logic is paraconsistent. As a consequence, the translated program does not re ect the behavior of defeasible logic when an inconsistency is involved, as in the following example. The only answer set of this program is fp; :p; q; :qg which does not agree with defeasible logic: the literal :q is included in the answer set but is not strictly provable in defeasible logic.
A Translation Using Control Literals
Above we outlined the reasons why a direct translation of a defeasible theory into a logic program must fail. Here we propose a di erent translation which uses \control literals" that carry meaning regarding the applicability status of rules.
First we translate strict rules. In defeasible logic, strict rules play a twofold role: on one hand they can be used to derive undisputed conclusions if all their antecedents have been strictly proved. And on the other hand they can be used essentially as defeasible rules, if their antecedents are defeasibly provable. These two roles can be clearly seen in the inference condition +@ is section 2.
To capture both uses we introduce mutually disjoint copies strict-p and defp, for all literals p. Note that this way the logic program we get does not have classical negation, as in the previous section. Among others, this solution avoids the problem illustrated by Example 3.
Given a strict rule r : fq 1 ; : : :; q n g ! p we translate it into the program clause a(r) : strict-p strict-q 1 ; : : :; strict-q n .
Additionally, we introduce the clause p q 1 ; : : :; q n ; not p. 
Kunen Semantics
Kunen semantics 13] is a 3-valued semantics for logic programs. An interpretation is a mapping from ground atoms to one of the three truth values t, f and u, which denote true, false and unknown, respectively. This mapping can be extended to arbitrary formulas using Kleene's 3-valued logic.
Kleene's truth tables can be summarized as follows. If ' is a boolean combination of atoms with truth values t, f or u, its truth value is t i all possible ways of putting t or f for the various u-values lead to a value t being computed in ordinary (2-valued) logic; ' gets the value f i not ' gets the value t; and ' gets the value u otherwise. These truth values can be extended in the obvious way to predicate logic, thinking of the quanti ers as in nite conjunctions or disjunctions.
The Kunen semantics of a program P is obtained from a sequence fI n g of interpretations, de ned as follows:
1. I 0 ( ) = u for every atom . 2. I n+1 ( ) = t i for some clause ' in the program, I n (') = t. 3. I n+1 ( ) = f i for all clauses ' in the program, I n (') = f. 4. I n+1 ( ) = u if neither 2. nor 3. applies.
We shall say that the Kunen semantics of P supports , written P`K , i there is an interpretation I n , for some nite n, such that I n ( ) = t.
A Translation of Defeasible Theories into Logic Programs

A Direct Translation that Fails
Here we consider the most natural translation of a defeasible theory into logic programs. Since in defeasible logic both positive and negative literals are used, the translation in this section yields an extended logic program. We will consider the answer set semantics for extended logic programs 9], which is a generalisation of the stable model semantics. Let us illustrate this de nition. To show that q is provable defeasibly we have two choices: (1) We show that q is already de nitely provable; or (2) we need to argue using the defeasible part of D as well. In particular, we require that there must be a strict or defeasible rule with head q which can be applied (2.1). But now we need to consider possible \counterattacks", that is, reasoning chains in support of q. To be more speci c: to prove q defeasibly we must show that q is not de nitely provable (2.2). Also (2.3) we must consider the set of all rules which are not known to be inapplicable and which have head q. Essentially each such rule s attacks the conclusion q. For q to be provable, each such rule s must have been established as non-applicable.
A 
Stable Model Semantics
Let M be a subset of the Herbrand base. We call a ground program clause A B 1 ; : : :; B n ; not C 1 ; : : :; not C m irrelevant w.r.t. M if at least one C i is included in M. Given a logic program P, we de ne the reduct of P w.r.t. M, denoted by P M , to be the logic program obtained from ground(P) by 1. removing all clauses that are irrelevant w.r.t. M, and 2. removing all premises not C i from all remaining program clauses. Note that the reduct P M is a de nite logic program, and we are no longer faced with the problem of assigning semantics to negation, but can use the least Herbrand model instead.
M is a stable model of P i M = M P M .
A rule r : A(r) , ! C(r) consists of its unique label r, its antecedent A(r) (A(r) may be omitted if it is the empty set) which is a nite set of literals, an arrow , ! (which is a placeholder for concrete arrows to be introduced in a moment), and its head (or consequent) C(r) which is a literal. In writing rules often we omit set notation for antecedents and sometimes we omit the label when it is not relevant for the context. There are two kinds of rules, each represented by a di erent arrow. Strict rules use ! and defeasible rules use ).
Given a set R of rules, we denote the set of all strict rules in R by R s , and the set of defeasible rules in R by R d . R q] denotes the set of rules in R with consequent q.
A defeasible theory D is a nite set of rules R.
Proof Theory
A conclusion of a defeasible theory D is a tagged literal. A conclusion has one of the following four forms:
{ + q, which is intended to mean that the literal q is de nitely provable, using only strict rules.
{ ? q, which is intended to mean that q is provably not strictly provable ( nite failure).
{ +@q, which is intended to mean that q is defeasibly provable in D. { ?@q which is intended to mean that we have proved that q is not defeasibly provable in D.
Provability is de ned below. It is based on the concept of a derivation (or proof) in D = R. A derivation is a nite sequence P = P(1); : : :; P(n) of tagged literals satisfying the following conditions. The conditions are essentially inference rules phrased as conditions on proofs. P(1::i) denotes the initial part of the sequence P of length i. That means, to prove + q we need to establish a proof for q using strict rules only. This is a deduction in the classical sense { no proofs for the negation of q need to be considered (in contrast to defeasible provability below, where opposing chains of reasoning must be taken into account, too). Strict rules are rules in the classical sense: whenever the premises are indisputable (e.g. facts) then so is the conclusion. An example of a strict rule is \Emus are birds". Written formally: emu(X) ! bird(X):
Defeasible rules are rules that can be defeated by contrary evidence. An example of such a rule is \Birds typically y"; written formally:
The idea is that if we know that something is a bird, then we may conclude that it ies, unless there is other, not inferior, evidence suggesting that it may not y.
The superiority relation among rules is used to de ne priorities among rules, that is, where one rule may override the conclusion of another rule. For example, given the defeasible rules r :
bird(X) ) flies(X) is strictly stronger than r, then we can indeed conclude that the bird cannot y.
It is worth noting that, in defeasible logic, priorities are local in the following sense: Two rules are considered to be competing with one another only if they have complementary heads. Thus, since the superiority relation is used to resolve con icts among competing rules, it is only used to compare rules with complementary heads; the information r > r 0 for rules r; r 0 without complementary heads may be part of the superiority relation, but has no e ect on the proof theory. 4] showed that there is a constructive, conclusion-preserving transformation which takes an arbitrary defeasible theory and translates it into a theory which has only strict rules and defeasible rules. For the sake of simplicity, we will assume in this paper that indeed a defeasible theory consists only of strict rules and defeasible rules.
Formal De nition
In this paper we restrict attention to essentially propositional defeasible logic. Rules with free variables are interpreted as rule schemas, that is, as the set of all ground instances; in such cases we assume that the Herbrand universe is nite. We assume that the reader is familiar with the notation and basic notions of propositional logic. If q is a literal, q denotes the complementary literal (if q is a positive literal p then q is :p; and if q is :p, then q is p).
Rules are de ned over a language (or signature) , the set of propositions (atoms) and labels that may be used in the rule.
